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INT. J. INCLUSIVE EDUCATION, 2000, VOL. 4, NO. 3, 253 ± 269
Rethinking social justice in schools: how will we
recognize it when we see it?
TREVOR GALE
(Originally received 4 May 1999; accepted in ® nal form 24 January 2000)
The dialogue of this paper operates at two levels. First, it seeks to rethink the various
perspectives on social justice evident in the academic literature, reviewing what is collec-
tively known about it and where current thinking is taking and/or should be taking us.
Second, it reports on research concerning the schooling of students with disabilities or,
more accurately, research concerning the practices of teachers in relation to the inclusion
of students with disabilities within ` mainstream’ classrooms. These two discussions come
together through their collaborative interest in recognizing social justice when they ` see’ it;
the data from the research are used to inform the theory it illustrates and the theory is used
to explain teachers’ practices. In this critical sense it is more than a dialogue, with its parts
dialectically related. The paper’ s critique also extends to questioning whose interests are
served (and whose are not) by various social justice perspectives and their applications to
schooling. It concludes that ` a critical theory of social justice must consider not only dis-
tributive patterns, but also the processes and relationships that produce and reproduce those
patterns’ (Young 1990: 241).
Introduction
Discussions of social justice have a long history, dating back to classical
times. Focusing on contemporary debates this paper categorizes social jus-
tice in terms of distribution, retribution and recognition. At times the
diå erences between these categories appear minimal and the diå erences
within them great, yet, as the paper attempts to demonstrate, the categories
oå er plausible and useful accounts that warrant their separations. Of these,
the paper favours a recognitive approach to social justice, concerned as it is
with rethinking social arrangements thought to be just, giving status to
things thought to be counterproductive and decentring concerns thought
to be pivotal. This rethinking leads to a view of social justice that values a
positive regard for group diå erences and for democratic processes based on
group representations. Indeed, this democratic reference to institutional
processes and procedures is a de® ning aspect of recognitive justice. In
this sense, social justice ` is not ` ` making’ ’ but ` ` acting’ ’ . It is not something
that can be, but something that can be done ’ (Lummis 1996: 160; original
emphasis; drawing on Arendt 1969).
The research reported here takes these understandings as its starting
point. Informed by Young’ s (1990: 150) observation that individuals can be
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discursively conscious about social justice but communicate less socially
just arrangements through their unconscious reactions and responses, the
paper focuses on teachers’ practices as revealed in interviews with teachers
and parents of students with disabilities. Three broad interests guide the
analysis of these discussions. What relations exist between schooling and
students that impinge on students’ socially just treatment? How are
teachers involved in these relations? How can teachers (and parents)
work to raise others’ consciousness concerning the socially just aspects of
their actions? In Dale’ s (1989) terms, these interests re¯ ect the topic for
research whereas its concern with the schooling of students with disabilities
provides its resource. In relation to the latter, 20 semistructured interviews
were conducted with parents and teachers across six Queensland
(Australian) government primary (elementary) schools and secondary
(high) schools. All interviews were audiotaped and later transcribed. To
maintain con® dences, extracts from these interviews are simply referenced
to indicate the interviewee’ s status as a teacher (T) or parent (P) and are
numbered to distinguish one interviewee from another.
The paper begins with an analysis of distributive justice. This is fol-
lowed by respective accounts of retributive and recognitive approaches.
Each includes discussion of their relative merits and each draws on the
research as a way of exploring and explaining them.
Distributive justice
One of the most famous modern authors on social justice matters is John
Rawls (1971) who thought his way through these issues by imagining how
people would respond if their starting or ` original positions’ in life were
equal and they had no prior knowledge (but possessed what he called ` a veil
of ignorance’ ) concerning the positions they would later attain. How would
they determine, for example, the dissection of a cake with no inkling of
which piece they were to get? Most likely, the pieces would be equally
weighted and would equal the number of persons. According to Rawls,
this is because such division is the only way for individuals to maximize
their eventual shares. Drawing on such hypothetical accounts, Rawls
argued that social justice involves two main principles: liberty, or indi-
vidual freedom (to the extent that this is compatible with the freedoms of
others); and the equal distribution of material and social goods (except
where an unequal distribution would contribute to the well-being of
those who have unfavourable starting positions). It is emphasis on this
latter principle that has given the approach its nomenclature as distributive
justice.
Rawls’ principles, and particularly their caveats, have often led social
theorists to ponder the freedoms and the (minimum) material and social
goods that individuals’ need, as a basis for determining and justifying any
unequal distribution. There are two ways in which this justi® cation ` prob-
lem’ has been addressed by social theorists and by social actors more
broadly. The ® rst involves a liberal-democratic form of distributive jus-
ticeÐ sometimes negatively referred to as a de® cit model of social justiceÐ
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which is premised on ` simple equality’ (Walzer 1983): an idea that regards
all individuals as having the same basic needs. The liberal-democratic sol-
ution to an equality imbalance is to compensate or normalize disadvantaged
individuals by supplying them with basic material and social goods that
meet their (dominantly determined) needs. Equality in this sense is a base-
line measure. In education contexts this is the rationale behind the pro-
vision of remedial classes for students who lack certain ` basic’ skills; often
those skills associated with such things as reading, writing and mathematics
(rarely sport, social studies, art, etc.) as well as skills related to behaviour
and citizenry. From this perspective, the disadvantaged are those who are
regarded as lacking what society deems to be the educational, social and
cultural basics.
This last point is important for understanding how a liberal-democratic
position diå ers from a social-democratic or diå erence model of social jus-
tice. Characterized by ` complex equality’ (Walzer 1983): which theorizes
that people do not have the same needs or the same resources at their
disposal to meet those needs, the social-democratic position argues not
just for unequal distributions of social goods but for the distribution of
diå erent social goods for diå erent people. These distinctions have given
rise to the adoption of the term ` equity’ (i.e. positive discrimination) as a
justi® ed deviation from ` equality’ and to register social justice as diå erent
from ` sameness’ . Moreover, social-democrats have attempted to address
(the logistics as well as the logic of) the ` relevant diå erence’ problem iden-
ti® ed by Aristotle (in Ryan 1993: 34± 40) and raised by the principle of
diå erent distributions to diå erent people, through references to social
groups rather than to disassociated individuals. Low socio-economic
groups, for example, might need access to additional ® nancial resources
to bene® t from education whereas girls as a group might require access
to educational opportunities previously denied them. Equality of oppor-
tunity, then, extends the notion of access to material goods to include access
to opportunities to acquire those goods; a diå erence which is sometimes
discussed in terms of aæ rmative action.
These diå erent ways of understanding distributive justice provide com-
peting guidelines for practice, as the secondary (high) schoolteacher (T4) in
the following interview extract demonstrates. Within the text, the teacher
seems caught between a desire for generalizable principles that are fair
because of their applicability to all and an (apologetic) admission that fair-
ness needs to account for her students’ unequal starting positions. In
exploring these issues, I asked her how her appreciation for diå erences in
` normal’ student behaviour in¯ uenced her teaching practices:
What eå ect does that have on your teaching? What do you do diå erently?
I think this is wrong in most instances. I have certainly been guilty of doing it and I
probably still am guilty until I pull myself out of it. If one student, for example, said
to me ` Ah shut-up miss’ and then another student said to me, ` shut-up miss’ , the
student that I know has problems at home and that behaviour would be accepted at
home, I wouldn’ t come down as hard on them as I would on the other person whom I
knew came from a fairly stable background. In a sense I know that is very unfair, but
that’ s probably something I’ m still learning about.
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What does fair mean? Does it mean treating every child the same, does it mean
treating every child according to what they need?
Well, that’ s the thing. I mean students will always say to you, ` Miss, he didn’ t get in
trouble, and I’ ve just done it and I’ ve got in trouble for it’ . They’ ll always pick you up
on it and they will always throw it at you. I think you have to have a consistent set of
rules where everybody has to abide by those rules, such as swearing or being danger-
ous in a Physical Education class, or being mobile in a class, that sort of thing. I think
they’ re consistent rules and they are covered in school rules, and, of course, in your
own classroom rules. But I think when it comes to diå erent behaviours and diå erent
attitudes and tones in voices, it’ s more individualised and you have to look behind
why they’ re doing what they’ re doing. (T4)
In many ways, these comments reveal a de® cit view of social justice, even
though the teacher is willing to acknowledge that similar student beha-
viours may require diå erent responses from her for diå erent students.
This de® cit view is seen when she refers to the student to whom she
gives her strongest response as coming from ` a fairly stable background’
while her other student is associated with ` problems at home’ . In other
words, the teacher’ s conception of diå erence with respect to these students’
backgrounds and how these in¯ uence their behaviour, is understood in
terms of stability and instability. To be fair, such either/or alternatives
might not be how this teacher sees all students and their backgrounds.
She does, after all, suggest that decisions regarding her responses need to
take into account each student’ s individual background. But there is still
some sense of a hierarchy of student backgrounds and her ` look behind the
scenes’ is also revealing of her liberal-democratic view of social justice
which recognizes diå erence at the level of individuals and not at the level
of social groupings. The teacher’ s feelings of guilt concerning her indiscre-
tions in not treating all her students according to one set of rules, also
indicate that she generally subscribes to the view that individuals share a
common set of needs. And her guilt is compounded by the schooling
system within which she works which legitimates ` a consistent set of
rules where everybody has to abide by those rules’ (T4) and by her students
who remind her of these institutional expectations.
Retributive justice
Other theorists have attempted to address these dilemmas for (teaching)
practice by reworking their understandings of social justice in ways that
privilege liberty and freedom in social interactions over the distribution of
social goods. This is in response to what Nozick (1976) sees as Rawls’
(1971) overemphasis on the social goods individuals possess and his under-
emphasis on the processes by which individuals produce and acquire these
goods. In his critique, Nozick reasons that individuals deserve and/or are
entitled to diå erential rewards in accordance with their diå erential contri-
butions to productive and competitive processes. Hence, social justice is
primarily concerned with fairness in the competition for goods (presum-
ably, capitalist markets provide the quintessential example) and is not a
matter of equalizing possessions. These similarities with the logic of mar-
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kets have prompted some writers to dub this conception of social justice as
` market-individualism’ (Rizvi and Lingard 1996, Taylor et al. 1997). In
education contexts, deserts and entitlements are often discussed in terms
of academic merit: the notion that students can be individually ranked
according to their academic performances (a function of their talents and
eå orts) and that they should be similarly rewarded (often through entry to
privileged positions in schooling, employment and within society gener-
ally).
What is seen by Nozick as unfair, then, are measures that both limit
individuals’ freedoms to exercise their talents and eå orts and those which
limit the rewards individuals receive from them. Nozick supports rules/
laws that protect an individual’ s life, property and freedom of movement
but is critical of those that interfere with an individual’ s activities and
possessions beyond this. Berlin (1969) has referred to such views of
social justice as indicative of a ` negative liberty’ which shuns regulation
(particularly from governments) but also requires rules or laws to protect
the just entitlements or rights of (self-determining) individuals to act
` without interference’ . Some writers have claimed that there is also a
sense of a narrow liberty in this perspective given that it favours ` property
rights’ over ` person rights’ . Apple (1988) uses these terms to argue that in a
market economy the extent to which individuals have power in social rela-
tions is a function of their property holdings rather than of their general
membership of society; an emphasis on property rights narrows the
number of individuals who can participate. Schools are replete with rules
that limit the activities of students, ostensibly for the purposes of pro-
moting students’ talents and eå orts and protecting their freedom to exer-
cise them. Copying, for example, is outlawed and punished in many
classrooms because it is seen as representing as one’ s own the intellectual
property of others. This is despite the fact that when such behaviour is
termed ` modelling’ it is interpreted as a very useful approach to learning.
These observations do not condone copying per se but oå er a reminder to
look behind the names given to actions to consider who bene® ts and who is
harmed by the meanings they are ascribed.
Carr and Hartnett (1996: 28) refer to this negative in¯ uence on social
justice as retributive: ` a means of punishing those who illegitimately
infringe the rights and freedoms of others’ . I also think that retributive
justice is useful in naming the perspective’ s (implicit) legitimization of
the retribution metered out to individuals who possess limited property
rights and, therefore, limited power to participate in decision-making pro-
cesses, as they are currently arranged. Despite claims of fairness in market
competition (the supposed virtue of ` the level playing ® eld’ ), the narrow
liberties of market relations ensure that there are ` distortions of the market:
it is not a fair market in talent and eå ort if it is not talent and eå ort that
determine the outcome’ (CSJ 1998: 48). In the private sector, for example,
company directors’ ` salaries and bonuses are often quite unrelated to the
performance of the company concerned, and are sometimes actually in-
versely correlated with company performance’ (CSJ 1998: 47).
There are at least two reasons for also making this claim about the
relationships between performances and rewards in educational contexts.
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First, there are the statistics that indicate that individuals from advantaged
social groups hold disproportionate amounts of society’ s goods. If talent
and eå ort are truly the criteria upon which individuals’ succeed, then one
should expect to ® nd ` success’ evenly distributed across social groups and
the rewards of talent and eå ort redistributed (through schooling) with
every new generation (Conant 1940: 598). The reality is very diå erent.
Many researchers have noted that in Western capitalist societies the gap
between rich and poor is growing and the inverse relationship between
poverty and academic success is so strong that ` the best advice we can
give to a poor child keen to get ahead through education is to choose
richer parents’ (Connell 1993: 22). Contrary to popular belief, talent and
eå ort are not always fairly rewarded in schools and in society generally.
Moreover, some suggest that talent is over-rated and does not warrant the
rewards it is oå ered. They argue that ` a person’ s talents, and his or her
capacity to make productive use of those talents, are very much matters of
luck [that is, acquired at birth and, therefore, out of his/her control] and are
also, in some part, the product of society. Nobody . . . deserves his or her
(natural) talents’ (CSJ 1998: 45; original emphasis).
Second, there are problems with trying to identify and justify talent.
Schools, it seems, are characterized by a particular organizing logic com-
patible with the dispositions of some students (typically those from domi-
nant groups in society) and not others. In such circumstances the talents of
students whose dispositions are most like those of schools are lauded and
rewarded; their similar dispositions can even be (mis)taken for talent. But
as for other students, ` the supposed fairness of meritocracy does not exist
because the schooling system frequently fails to see the potential of those
who do not inherit the language, culture, and values of the upper classes’
(Brint 1998: 183). Talent, and the lack of it, is also diæ cult to justify, not
least because of its connections with the social contexts in which they are
expressed. In short, ` it is not possible to completely isolate measured
` ` intelligence’ ’ from social background. Even if we accept IQ scores as
good measures of intelligenceÐ something that many leading scientists no
longer do . . . we ® nd that IQ scores are substantially conditioned by the
social environment’ (Brint 1998: 191).
Several of these issues ® nd expression in the comments of teachers
within the research. For example, in responding to questions about how
teachers adjust their teaching to accommodate students with learning diæ -
culties, one primary (elementary) schoolteacher (T8) explained:
You have to understand that the level we’ re talking about is that they’ re not indepen-
dent learners. The ® rst thing you experience as a teacher is the need to be prepared.
I’ ve had educational psychologists say this to me but I’ d just love them to show me
how to do it. To get these kids integrated you have a little program; we photocopy a
little book and bind it and it looks really cute and the kid can colour in the pictures.
The kid can’ t read the instructions and that’ s your ® rst problem. You open up the
book and it’ s useless because the kid doesn’ t know what to do. You then have to come
back and read the instructions for that child while there are twenty odd others hanging
around. Then, of course, the kid probably has a very short concentration span, or a
short-term memory problem and can’ t stay on task anyway. Then you resolve that by
sitting with the child, tapping at the desk while you’ re marking sixteen other things
with the kids in a line over here. Not that you’ re servicing your other children because
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you’ re sitting there trying to keep one child on task, and the twenty others can be
doing what they like. The child can’ t mark it, they can’ t self correct it, etc. (T8)
In analysing these comments and others like them I do not want to suggest
that teachers are unsympathetic to the well being of their students and, in
particular, to students with diæ culties such as the one described here. But
what is interesting in this teacher’ s comments is her belief in the right of
` the twenty others’ to equal teacher time, even though she recognizes that
her practice suggests otherwise. Students are entitled to equal ` servicing’ ,
as she puts it; a revealing comment given that education is increasingly
portrayed in market terms. More revealing is the teacher’ s discourse that
frames the issues as those of talent and focuses attention on the struggling
student rather than on the classroom’ s curricula and pedagogy. The class-
room, it would seem, is organized to accommodate independent learners:
students who can follow written instructions, who have extended concen-
tration and memory spans, who can complete tasks independently of others
and who are self-correcting. Those who fail this test of isolation from other
students and, to a lesser degree, from their teacher are regarded as lacking
talent. However, what is not recognized is that this organization of learning
is not independent from broader cultural norms. Rather, it is a social con-
struction informed by a particular view of what education is, itself
embedded in the values of dominant social groups. Given a diå erent organ-
ization of curricula and pedagogy in the teacher’ s classroomÐ of collective
study groups with genuine input into what is to be learnt, for exampleÐ this
student might not feature as a ` problem’ .
Recognitive justice
A third group of theorists and activists advocates a somewhat diå erent view
of social justice that attempts to insert procedural issues back into the
discussion. This diå erence should not be taken to mean that all things
previously learnt are discarded. There are diå erences in this third account
but it also incorporates aspects of those already considered. Indeed, this is
an important reading of diå erence within the perspective itself that recog-
nizes diå erences and areas of commonality among cultural groups.
Informed by the work of theorists such as Young (1990) and Fraser
(1995), I refer to this perspective as recognitive justice because of its insis-
tence (1) to rethink what we mean by social justice and (2) to acknowledge
the place of social groups within this. These two meanings for recognition
form the broad parameters for an expanded view of justice.
The recognitive imperative to rethink social justice involves beginning
with its root meanings. Lummis (1996: 24± 26) writes in this way about
Radical Democracy; the adjective, ` radical’ , purposefully chosen to intensify
rather than to modify the noun, to draw attention to the thing itself and to
suggest motion. Advocates of recognitive justice think similarly about
social justice, that a radical response is required to redress its restrictive
conceptions. Their intent is to increase the potency of social justice, to
emphasize issues which promote its achievement particularly those that
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draw attention to actions and not simply to the outcomes of those actions.
In this radical vein, one would do well to remember the insights of
Justinian from the sixth century who referred to social justice as ` the con-
stant and perpetual will to render to everyone their due ’ (Isaacs 1996: 42; my
emphasis); a de® nition which forms the basis for the comparisons in Figure
1 below. Throughout I have assumed that social justice of this kind rests on
` the equal moral worth of all persons’ (Young 1990: 37), although readings
of historical and contemporary contexts suggest that these assumptions are
not universally valued. Of course, political will is a necessary requirement
for social justice but it can also be subverted through a narrow under-
standing of what it should encompass.
Distributive and retributive conceptions of social justice share at least
three characteristics that serve to narrow their foci in this way. First, they
tend to be concerned with people’ s assets (or lack thereof) and only mini-
mally with social processes and procedures which (re)produce those assets.
Some even regard a regulatory focus on these actions as evidence of social
injustice. Second, and relatedly, this static emphasis on material goodsÐ
dubiously extended to include social goods such as opportunity, position,
power, etc.Ð limits concern to the socially just distribution of goods, typi-
cally patterned on statistical models: $X spent on each student in the edu-
cation system, X%of women represented among principals, etc. Third, this
` impartial’ treatment at best regards all people as the sameÐ an appeal to
hegemony that Lummis (1996: 26) likens to the illusion of the emperor’ s
new clothesÐ or at worst serves to hide the assimilation of group diå erences
by the dominant. As Young (1990: 205) expresses it, ` the ideal of imparti-
ality encourages the universalization of the particular’ . In short, the criti-
cism of distributive and retributive justice perspectives is that they tend to
con® ne their interests to economic spheres and ignore the cultural politics
of social institutions, such as schools.
Lummis’ (1996) approach to rethinking democracy has the potential to
address these criticisms. Democracy, Lummis notes, can be translated from
its Greek origins demos and kratia as ` people power’ . But, like social justice,
` it describes an ideal, not a method of achieving it’ (p. 22). Hence, the
democratic struggle involves addressing such issues as ` who are the
people? What is power?’ (p. 22). These are important questions for those
who also struggle for social justice and, as the criticisms above imply,
require answers that recognize the validity of social groups and address
institutional processes. Informed by these acknowledgements, recognitive
justiceÐ or ` positive liberty’ , to rework Berlin’ s (1969) earlier phraseÐ
advocates three necessary conditions for social justice: (1) fostering respect
for diå erent social groups through their self-identi® cation; (2) opportu-
nities for groups’ self-development and self-expression; and (3) the parti-
cipation of groups in making decisions that directly eå ect them, through
their representation on determining bodies. Heeding Justinian’ s instruction
that our desire for social justice needs to be ` constant and perpetual’ , recog-
nitive justice moves beyond ` an approach to social justice that gives pri-
macy to having [to] one that gives primacy to doing ’ (Young 1990: 8; my
emphasis).
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Conditions of self-identity and self-respect
How, then, do teachers who subscribe to recognitive justice acknowledge
the equal moral worth of their students? How can they foster self-respect in
their students and facilitate positive self-identities for students from dif-
ferent social groups? In researching these issues, I asked parents about the
ways in which their children are identi® ed by teachers within their class-
rooms. I was interested in both how these identi® cations re¯ ect broader
institutional arrangements and how they found expression within the aca-
demic language of schooling. Among others, one parent (P6) commented
on the ways in which school assessments are linked with student identities
and how these identities are often assigned to students rather than devel-
oped from positive images of themselves. This was in response to my
inquiries about her daughter’ s assessment as having a Level 6 dis-
abilityÐ the highest level of disability on the school’ s assessment scaleÐ
and how this featured in teachers’ understandings of who her daughter was
and her (future) placement in their classes:
If your child is a [Level] 6 the teachers go into the next room and say ` Okay who is
going to take this Level 6?’ or the ` nice’ ones say ` Who is going to take this child, she is
a Level 6?’ That is what they see. They don’ t see who the child is.
If they said ` Who is going to take Cindy?’ that would be a diå erent matter?
That’ s right. If they put up Cindy’ s name they might say ` Oh yes, I know Cindy, she’ s
alright’ . I know they ask who would like to take this child because they tell me that’ s
what they do. It is pretty awful, but I understand that.
It is much better to have teachers who want your child in their class?
Yes. I’ d much rather have a teacher with the right attitude; if it is a teacher that says
` I’ ll take Cindy’ rather than, ` I’ ll take the Level 6’ . Some people have a noble attitude
of ` I’ ll take the [Level] 6’ and that really gets up my nose. This charitable person.
If I was able to ask Cindy ` What does it mean to be disabled?’ , what do you think
she’ d say?
She knows that she has got Down’ s syndrome. It is hard to know what she thinks,
[although] she is aware that she can’ t do some things that the other kids do and she is
very conscious that her language is not as good as other kids. Her friends accept her
but around other people she is really conscious [of her diå erences] and that is why she
doesn’ t talk to strangers very much. Whether she considers herself as having a dis-
ability, I couldn’ t say. Her sister [Naomi], is the same [in her understanding of these
things]. She asked me the other day, ` Does Cindy have a disability?’ She knows that
she has Down’ s syndrome. I said ` Some people in society would say that she has’ . She
said ` Oh! I thought it was just people who were in wheel chairs’ . That is the concept
that kids have . . . I would hate her [Cindy] even knowing that [others label her as
disabled]. She just thinks that she’ s Naomi’ s sister and our daughter and this is her
school. All of this disability stuå and the fact that she might be excludedÐ she’ s only
six [years old] so it is above her head. Her and her sister are the same [in the way they
understand these things]. I think that if she [Cindy] went to a Special School or Unit
it would be just incomprehensible [for both of them]. (P6)
Having Down’ s syndrome is clearly diå erent from being female, having
limited access to ® nancial resources, or belonging to a racial and/or ethnic
minorityÐ although these are not necessarily mutually exclusive groups.
But the issues discussed above are not particular to Down’ s syndrome.
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They are more broadly illustrative of the ways in which assigned group
identities tend to ensure that ` only the oppressed and excluded groups are
de® ned as diå erent’ (Young 1990: 170). Within a recognitive justice per-
spective, diå erence is diå erently valued. It ` does not imply that there are
not overlapping experiences, or that two groups have nothing in common’
(Young 1990: 171). While Cindy’ s (dis)abilities were assessed at Level 6
this also became her identity assigned to her by the school. It is an identity
that serves to accentuate her diå erences from her peers while her simila-
rities are silenced. In this respect, Cindy’ s story is not unlike that of
students with gendered, raced and classed identities of social disadvantage.
The ` storyteller’ is generally someone else, which belies just conditions for
self-identity and self-respect that require starting points for thinking about
social arrangements other than the vantagepoints of the dominant.
Some would claim equality in that the storyteller is the same for all
groups. That is, the school’ s assessment procedures operate under the
banner of equality since everyone is subjected to the same measures even
if everyone does not measure-up equally. But as Beilharz (1989) notes and
Cindy’ s mother con® rms, ` to argue in this way is necessarily to introduce
the logic of charity; and the language of the ` ` needy’ ’ , for there are citizens,
and there are those outside the city gates, who are deserving compassion’
(p. 93). This form of charityÐ the well-intentioned but dominant orienta-
tions of teachersÐ threatens Cindy’ s self-worth by concentrating on her
disabilities and displacing her view of her own identity formed within
her family unit. Cindy herself is aware of her diå erences but they are
understood at the level of relations and processes. The recognitive perspec-
tive on social justice begins from the standpoint of the least advantaged; it is
an ` approach [that] attempts to generalize the point of view of the disad-
vantaged rather than separate it oå ’ (Connell 1993: 52; original emphasis)
and thereby change everybody’ s sense of self (Fraser 1995).
Conditions of self-development and self-expression
Recognizing social groups as they identify themselves and gaining a new
sense of oneself goes part way towards redressing social oppression.
However, teachers who favour recognitive justice also need to address
oppressive institutional processes that inhibit the development of their
students. As Young (1990: 38) explains, ` oppression consists in systematic
institutional processes which prevent some people from learning and using
satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings, or institution-
alized social processes that inhibit people’ s ability to play and communicate
with others or to express their feelings and perspective on social life in
contexts where others can listen’ . In the research reported here, I was
speci® cally interested in examining the institutional processes of schooling
within classroom settings and school contexts. I wanted to know how
teachers were implicated in these processes. What can and do teachers
do, for example, to promote the development of their students’ abilities
and to encourage student expressions of their experiences?
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Two teachers who collaboratively taught a class of 50 primary (elemen-
tary) school students related the following account of their eå orts to redress
the injustices of their schooling system; injustices metered out to one par-
ticular student (David) through procedures that largely prevented him
from developing and utilizing his skills and which inhibited his expression
of his feelings. Again, it is an illustration of a student with a disabilityÐ
severe cerebral palsyÐ and some might be tempted to think that oppression
of students from such groups is more likely given the extent of their re-
liance on others or at least the extent to which they are portrayed as more
reliant. Certainly, the particular oppression experienced by this student is
related to his disability and the context in which he was located. I imagine
that for others oppression would take diå erent forms and substance.
However, the following interview extract should be read ® rst as an example
of institutional constraint on a student exercising his capacities and express-
ing his experiences, not as illustrative of institutional constraints on par-
ticular student capacities and experiences. This in mind, I asked these
teachers about their experiences of schooling as a constraining in¯ uence
on student development. One of them (T11) related her and her colleague’ s
struggle with their institution and its administration to create the con-
ditions necessary for David’ s self-development and self-expression:
We felt that this child had every right to communicate with us if he could do so and he
should be given that opportunity. At that stage all he could do was give us a yes/no
response with his mouth, by the shape of his mouth. We were knocked back every-
where we went [in our eå orts to help him communicate] and we ended up putting in
[funding] submissions ourselves to various commissions and clubs to get this child a
computerÐ and the paraphernalia that went with itÐ so that he could start commu-
nicating. That was quite successful [but] it was a lot of work . . . [Before that] we had
screaming for hours because that was his only way of saying ` I ’ m angry’ . . . . We
actually got the ® rst computer from a diå erent part of the school. It was in the library.
. . . [I] got myself into quite a bit of trouble. [I was told by an accomplice within the
system’ s administration] that if we wished to get the equipment that this child needed
that we had to set ourselves up and learn to be disliked . . . [and] that we were going to
create some friction.
Why?
Well, because you have [challenged] a basic principle. We had one child who was
going to tie up a computer. That computer was in the library and was accessed by
however many hundreds of children. At that time it was the only Apple Mac[intosh
computer] in the school so there was software that could only be used on that par-
ticular computer. When it was brought up into our room it meant that the access went
from 500 down to 50Ð we did use it for other children as well at that time. It caused
friction. It did cause friction and there was a mentality, and there still is I think, that
questioned ` Why should all of that money be spent for one child when you have X
number of children in the school?’ I can see where that kind of thinking comes from. I
have no trouble identifying with that but at the same time we had a child here that we
felt had the ability to communicate and [he] wasn’ t being given the opportunity to do
so. We had a duty of care to him to let him try to say ` Hey, I’ m feeling really sick’ or
` Just leave me alone, give me some time out’ . Once we got that [computer] going he
actually voiced those feelings for the ® rst time in his life. (T11)
One of the ® rst things these comments illustrate is how distributive
accounts of social justiceÐ particularly liberal-democratic versionsÐ fall
short of delivering justice for David. Equal opportunities to communicate
RETHINKING SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SCHOOLS 263
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
9:4
1 1
1 J
un
e 2
01
2 
with and learn alongside his peers, for example, were not facilitated simply
by his inclusion in the same classroom; access does not automatically
deliver equality. The absurdity of thinking otherwise is stark in this par-
ticular situation and in others has fuelled (errant) arguments against inclu-
sive school practices for similar students with disabilities. Illustrated more
generally is that students, whatever their diå erences, do not enter class-
rooms with the same capacities to communicate and that classrooms and
schooling systems of themselves do not take account of these diå erences.
Still, except for ` those outside the city gates, who are deserving compassion’
(Beilharz 1989: 93), such arrangements appear quite fair to those who hold
to market conceptions of social justice and classroom interactions ` based on
the assumptions of homogeneity and uniformity’ (Taylor et al. 1997: 151).
The ` bar’ of exception seems raised in this retributive perspective and by
comparison with distributive models of social justice.
A second and related matter that this interview extract raises is the way
in which individuals and institutions utilize social justice discourse, notably
liberal-democratic versions of distributive justice, to maintain unjust social
arrangements. It is not fair, it is argued, to deny the entire school popula-
tion access to its library computer for the sake of one studentÐ and a few of
his peers (a concession which the teachers oå er to dilute the strength of this
distributive argument). Neither is it fair, it seems, to spend dispropor-
tionate amounts of money on resources speci® cally for the use of one
student. Certainly, material aspects of social justice are important but
they should re¯ ect the outcomes of socially just practices, not drive
them. One could just as readily inquire about the utilization and redeploy-
ment of other resources in the school although this, too, tends to draw
attention to who has what rather than what is being done to redress the
institutional oppression of students. This raises a third observation, that
recognitive justice primarily ® nds expression in processes. Lummis (1996:
160) writes similarly about democracy: ` the actuality of democracy itselfÐ
the people’ s powerÐ exists while the performance is taking place’ . Clearly,
these teachers are active in their pursuit of social justice, not simply in their
eå orts to acquire needed resources but more broadly in their ` constant and
perpetual’ struggle to secure the conditions for their student’ s self-devel-
opment and self-expression. This is how justice is measured, not in
whether David has access to the classroom and to a particular computer
even though these serve the processes of his development.
Conditions of self-determination
What is evident here is that students’ self-development and self-expression
require their participation in the educational process. However, what is also
evident is that the participation envisaged by recognitive justice is more
than simply accessing opportunities to learn and engage in tasks deter-
mined by others. There is nothing intrinsically libratory in such participa-
tion. Rather, what counts in social justice terms is how participation is
determined: through processes that take account of the interests of all
participants or those that serve the interests of dominant groups?
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According to Young (1990: 38), ` domination consists in institutional con-
ditions which inhibit or prevent people from participating in determining
their actions or the conditions of their actions’ . What is required to address
such domination are levels of involvement which are premised on self-
determination, which facilitate the representation of aå ected interest
groups in decision-making processes.
Knight has recently written in these terms about dominating institu-
tional processes waged against one secondary (high) school and its struggle
to ` participate in decisions de® ning important educational knowledge’
(1998: 295) within its community. The school, itself committed to the
involvement of its constituents in curriculum decisions of this kind, was
shut out of government decision-making that resolved to withdraw ® nan-
cial support and to close the school. The government’ s decision was met
with considerable opposition: not only delaying tactics, temporary accom-
modation provided by the community, instruction delivered by volunteer
teachers, but also student and community participation in broader deci-
sion-making processes in the form of the legal system. As Knight (1998:
295) explains, ` the school and local community sought to expand the con-
cept of accountability as de® ned by the State’ . It was these broader avenues
that ® nally secured the oæ cial re-opening of the school, the law courts
ruling that through the school’ s closure the government had discriminated
against its minority group students.
Parents of students with disabilities interviewed in the research
reported here experienced similar problems with school policies regulating
the placement of their children in particular classes, producing guidelines
for practice which seemed at odds with government discrimination laws.
For parents faced with these decisions, ` what is annoying is that you have to
® ght’ (P4); the weight of evidence and research concerning the bene® ts of
inclusive teaching practices not always enough to secure the involvement of
parents (and students) alongside teachers in determinations within schools
and classrooms. In the end:
They can pull the carpet out [from under my feet] and the only thing supporting me
would be the Disability Act saying that you can’ t discriminate on the basis of the
disability. That is the only thing that we’ ve got to ® ght with at this stage. I would use
it if I had to. I haven’ t had to yet. I would use my research as a weapon. You wouldn’ t
use that [legal avenue] until you really had to, but I ® nd that most people, once they
learn what you know, they’ re willing to change. (P4)
This is consistent with commentaries that represent many teachers as una-
ware of social justice matters and which suggest that ` diå erential privilege
of members of diå erent . . . groups is perpetuated in part by the process of
schooling . . . [for example] many if not most teachers unconsciously behave
diå erently towards Blacks or Latinos than they behave toward whites’
(Young 1990: 154). Hence, in conducting research of teachers’ practices I
was particularly interested in the educative attempts or ` strategies of con-
sciousness raising’ (Young 1990: 155) employed by parents and directed at
teachers and schools, to secure meaningful participation in school processes
that aå ected their children, especially where these students were not repre-
sentative of dominant groups. One parent (P3), a leader of a self-help group
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for parents of children with disabilities, provided the following account of
her educative project with teachers and the schooling system more broadly:
It is not easy because the teachers are still going through this change as well. They’ re
not used to teaching kids who are diå erent and [determining] how they’ re supposed to
do it. I can handle that, it doesn’ t bother me. If the teachers are willing to learn you
can sit down together. That’ s what we have done at our school. It wasn’ t easy to start
with but we have got this communication going that teachers can come up with good
ideas for [enabling] children [who are diå erent] to be included [in classrooms]. What
scares me . . . is having to start again with the new teacher. The Special Education
teacher has been quite cooperative even though she hasn’ t understood where I am
coming from and if she goes I’ ll get a new one and the battle will start over again.
There’ s no consistency in the [schooling system] about what we’ re doing . . .
What kind of relationship do you think your fellow parents have with teachers gen-
erally?
It is really hard because what normally happens is that parents have got this idea of
what they want. If they know about inclusion and that’ s what they’ ve decided [to
pursue], that’ s what they want. Most teachers haven’ t heard of it [inclusion]. No, I
shouldn’ t say [they] haven’ t heard of it, [rather, they] may not agree with it or they’ ll
do what the Special Education teacher tells them and they’ ve only been taught [how to
teach in] one way. It can get really confusing and therefore there is an automatic clash
and that usually happens with everyone [every parent] I know. They’ ve had that
happen to them. You’ ve got to be a very good communicator to get past that and
what I tell parents is that you can’ t do it alone. I can go and support another parent
and I can feel very con® dent I know what I’ m talking about. But when it comes to my
child I just break down and cry. It is such an emotional thing and that’ s why you need
that support there when you’ re talking to teachers. They’ ll come up with all of this
jargon and the other thing that they do to is have one or two extra educators there. If
they know that you’ re going to bring three, they’ ll take four. It is a power game: ` If we
can get more people on side then we’ ll convince them’ . These are the games that we’ re
talking about. That is what has helped me get to where I am. Most parents say ` I can’ t
do this and give up’ and then they do whatever the [schooling system] wants. It is
easier for them and that’ s what it boils down to. (P3)
There are at least two matters in these comments that warrant our atten-
tion. First, self-determination does not mean separate determination. In
both this account and the one related by Knight, dominated groups
struggled to rework not to abandon institutional processes. What could
also be assumed is that it is not socially just for the dominant to ` mag-
nanimously’ grant self-determination to minority groupsÐ in some distant
corner somewhereÐ as a way of ridding themselves of their responsibilities
to collectively struggle for just social arrangements. To reiterate, the
imperative of social justice is ` to generalize the point of view of the disad-
vantaged rather than separate it oå ’ (Connell 1993: 52; original emphasis).
This calls for open and public forums in which diå erent groups can ` sit
down together’ , however diæ cult that may appear at times and however
diå erent their voices may sound, and enter into meaningful dialogue. Self-
determination is a collaborative exercise and an educative one.
Which leads to a second and related observation: socially just pro-
cessesÐ ones that foster self-determinationÐ are necessarily democratic
ones. Indeed, ` democracy is both an element and a condition of social
justice’ (Young 1990: 91). Lummis (1996: 37) records the political virtues
of democracy as ` the commitment to, knowledge of, and ability to stand for
the whole’ . None of these include the ` stand-over’ tactics or ` power games’
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employed in the above examples, such as the use of exclusive professional
language, status, or the weight of numbers. In relation to the latter, some
may wonder whether democratic processes that rely on the principle of ` one
person one vote’ Ð often championed by liberal democratsÐ can ever deliver
social justice for minority groups. What this individualization of the demo-
cratic process hides, however, is the way it works to promote the interests
of dominant groups. Recognitive justice openly requires the representation
of the interests of groupsÐ not simply the interests of atomized individ-
ualsÐ and for their views to be seriously engaged within decision-making
processes. This is not just important for the disadvantaged:
Having and exercising the opportunity to participate in making collective decisions
that aå ect one’ s actions or the conditions of one’ s actions fosters the development of
capacities for thinking about one’ s own needs in relation to the needs of others, taking
an interest in the relation of others to social institutions, reasoning and being articu-
late and persuasive, and so on. (Young 1990: 92)
All people bene® t from such educative processes that maximize the knowl-
edge and perspectives that contribute to decisions about possible future
actions.
Conclusion
Figure 1 provides an overview of the three social justice perspectives can-
vassed in this paper. Its structure is based on Justinian’ s de® nition of
justice, each perspective oå ering an interpretation and elaboration of his
references to ` the will’ , ` to render’ , ` to everyone’ , ` their due’ . As implied in
the body of the paper, there are also similarities hereÐ in style and in
substanceÐ with Lummis’ (1996: 22) questioning of democracy about
which he asks: ` who are the people? What is power? Should the people
have the power? How could such a situation be arranged? By what set of
institutions could it be guaranteed?’ . There is not necessarily a direct one-
to-one correspondence between these questions and the questions and
answers represented in the table, although Lummis’ concerns can possibly
be answered by reading across the columns.
Throughout, I have argued in favour of the third perspective in this
tableÐ recognitive justiceÐ for its expanded understanding of social justice
that includes a positive regard for social diå erence and the centrality of
socially democratic processes in working towards its achievement. Yet, in
adhering to this position I want to avoid suggesting that material conditions
and distributive matters are unrelated to or are unimportant in de® ning and
practising social justice. Nor do I want to underestimate the considerable
gains that have been made through advocating the equal treatment of indi-
viduals. Clearly, these matters are important in delivering social justice but
they are also part of a larger project, not the project itself. That is, shifting
` from a focus on distributive patterns to procedural issues of participation
in deliberation and decision-making’ (Young 1990: 34) does not mean
abandoning interests in ` who has what’ . The place to begin, nonetheless,
remains with processes embedded in institutions. Indeed, I tend to think
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that this is the site to address social inequities generally. How then will we
recognize social justice in schools when we see it? In the ways in which
students are identi® ed and the extent to which all those involved in
schoolingÐ parents, students, teachers, administrators, etc.Ð are also
involved in their own development and in determining schooling’ s pur-
poses.
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Just ice: the will ...  
 
What should social justice 
desire?  Whose desire?  
... to  render ...  
 
How should social 
justice be achieved?  
... to  everyone ... 
 
Who should social 
justice benef it?  
... their due. 
 
What should social 
justice deliver? 
 
Distributive 
justice 
freedom, social cooperation 
and compensation for those 
who lack the basics 
 
individuals/groups, 
represented by government 
authorities 
 
through proportional 
distributions to 
individuals/groups 
disadvantaged 
individuals/groups 
material and social 
goods/opportunities 
basic to social life 
 
Retributive 
justice 
liberty, protection of  rights 
and punishment for those 
who infringe these rights 
 
individuals, displayed in 
their free interactions (e.g . in 
the market place) 
 
through open 
competition and 
(government) protection 
of  life and property 
individuals who 
contribute to society 
material and social 
goods/opportunities 
commensurate with 
talent and ef fort 
 
Recognitive 
justice 
provision of  the means for 
all people to exercise their 
capabilities and determine 
their actions 
 
all people, expressed within 
and among  social groups 
through democratic 
processes that include 
the interests of  the least 
advantaged 
 
all people, dif ferently 
experienced within 
and among  dif ferent 
social groups 
positive self -identity ; 
self -development; 
self -determination 
 
Figure 1. Perspectives on social justice.
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